Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship

1999

From the Bankruptcy Courts: When an
Oversecured Creditor Is Entitled to Postpetition
Interest at the Default Rate: The Thirty-Six Percent
Award
Alan N. Resnick
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Brad Eric Scheler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Alan N. Resnick and Brad Eric Scheler, From the Bankruptcy Courts: When an Oversecured Creditor Is Entitled to Postpetition Interest at
the Default Rate: The Thirty-Six Percent Award, 32 UCC L.J. 212 (1999)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/851

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick* and Brad Eric Scheler**

WHEN AN OVERSECURED
CREDITOR IS ENTITLED TO
POSTPETITION INTEREST AT
THE DEFAULT RATE: THE
THIRTY-SIX PERCENT AWARD

In general, interest that accrues
after the filing of a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code is
not allowable in the bankruptcy
case. 1 The accrual of interest stops
when the case is commenced. However, the Bankruptcy Code provides
an exception whereby postpetition
interest may be recovered by the
holder of a secured claim in certain
circumstances. 2 When the value of
the collateral, after deducting any
reasonable expenses that the trustee
or debtor in possession may recover
for preserving or disposing of the
property,3 exceeds the amoupt of the
secured creditor's allowed claim, the
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in the preparation of this article.
1
See II U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).
2
II U.S.C. § 506(b).
3
See II U.S.C. § 506(c).

secured creditor will have an allowable claim for postpetition interest
that accrues during the bankruptcy
case to the extent of the excess collateral value. In addition, an
oversecured creditor has an allowable claim for any reasonable fees,
costs, or charges, including attorney
fees, provided for in the loan agreement. In no event may the creditor's
claim for postpetition interest and
fees exceed the excess value of the
collateral over the amount of the
claim.
Most courts agree that the
appropriate rate of postpetition
interest applicable to an oversecured
creditor's claim is the rate set forth
in the contract. 4 However, financial
contracts often provide for a basic
interest rate that will apply while the
borrower is in compliance with the
agreement, and a higher rate of
interest that will apply if the
borrower defaults on its obligations.
The justification for a separate
default rate is the need to
compensate lenders for increased
risk and costs (both predictable and
unpredictable) of monitoring a loan
in default situations. If the conditions
to the default rate of interest have
4
If there is no contract rate, the rate provided under applicable nonbankruptcy Jaw
would govern.
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been triggered, will the bankruptcy
court allow the oversecured creditor
to recover the default rate of interest?
Courts that have addressed the
question of whether to apply the default rate, rather than the basic contract rate, often begin their analysis
with a presumption that oversecured
creditors are entitled to the contractual default rate, if enforceable under nonbankruptcy law, subject to
rebuttal based on equitable considerations. These equitable considerations were recently examined in In
re Dixon,5 a case in which a federal
district court in West Virginia allowed
an oversecured creditor to recover, as
part of its allowed claim in a bankruptcy case, interest at the contractual
default rate of thirty-six percent.
The Facts
In Dixon, Dixon Development
Group, Inc. ("DDG"), a corporation
owned by Glenn S. Dixon
("Debtor"), was a borrower under a
loan agreement with Florida Asset
Financing Corporation ("Lender").
The principal amount of the loan was
$150,000. The terms of the loan
documents provided for basic interest at the rate of eighteen percent,
late charges for delinquent payments
at five percent and, upon default, a
default rate of interest of thirty-six
percent. The obligations of DDG
under the loan documents were guaranteed by the Debtor. Also in connection with the loan, DDG and the
Debtor executed separate security
5 228

B.R. 166 (W.D. Va. 1998).

agreements in favor of the Lender
granting security interests in certain
real property, shares of stock, inventory, accounts, and equipment,
among other things, valued at approximately one million dollars.
Approximately ten months after
executing the financing agreement,
DDG defaulted under the terms of
the financing agreement. The Debtor
subsequently filed for chapter 11
protection. The Lender filed a proof
of claim in the Debtor's bankruptcy
case settig_g forth the principal
amount due on the loan, late fees of
five percent accrued up to the time
of default, and interest running at
thirty-six percent thereafter. The
Debtor objected to the Lender's
proof of claim on the basis that the
thirty-six percent interest rate was
punitive in nature and, therefore,
barred under the Bankruptcy Code.
Agreeing with the Debtor, the
bankruptcy court held that the default interest rate of thirty-six percent was not interest, but rather was
in the nature of a penalty and punitive. Furthermore, the bankruptcy
court held that the Lender had not
introduced evidence to support the
particular default rate nor otherwise
shown it to be commercially reasonable. Consequently, the bankruptcy
court found the interest rate excessive and reduced the Lender's claim
to the pre-default rate of eighteen
percent.
District Court Reverses

On appeal, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's deci-
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sian. Commenting that the Bankruptcy Code and the legislative history of section 506(b) do not provide
guidance as to the appropriate rate
of interest applicable to an
oversecured creditor's claim, the district court began its analysis by stating that:
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no underlying contract providing for
interest on the claim.

The majority of jurisdictions allow, or
at least give "a presumption to the
allowability of, default rates of interest, provided that the rate is not unenforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law."6

By opining that "[r]ecovery of
postpetition interest is unqualified"
and not reliant on a consensual agreement, whereas recovery offees, costs,
and charges is qualified by the tw.ofold requirement that they be provided for in an agreement and meet a
reasonableness test, the Court interpreted the statute to yield two distinct
types of recovery. 9

However, the Ron Pair decision was
limited to the issue of entitlement to
postpetiton interest. The Supreme
Courts that have addressed the issue Court did not decide what the approalso acknowledge that certain cir- priate rate of interest should be.
cumstances might require an equiAlthough the award of postpetitable deviation from the contractual tion interest is in part governed by
default interest rate. "Unfortunately, equitable principles, 10 the Bank'there is no clear, emerging definite ruptcy Code provides oversecured
eimmeration of [the] special circum- creditors with certain statutory rights
stances or equitable considerations' to interest. As the Supreme Court
which mandate an equitable devia- noted in Ron Pair, the legislative intion from the contractual default in- tent behind formulating the Bankterest rate. " 7 The district court noted ruptcy Code to include the
that the Supreme Court had not ad-· unqualified entitlement to postpetidressed the rate of interest issue un- tion interest in section 506(b) was
der section 506(b), nor has a to "codif[y] creditors' rights more
consensus developed among the clearly than the case law ... [b]y
courts of appeals. ,
The district court then examined
9
228 B.R. at 171 (quoting 489 U.S. at
United States v. Ron Pair Enter241-242).
8
prises, lnc., a decision by the
1
0 The Seventh Circuit has noted that
United States Supreme Court hold- "[w]hat emerges from the post-Ron Pair
ing that an oversecured creditor's decisions is a presumption in favor of the
contract rate subject to rebuttal based upon
right to postpetition interest under equitable considerations." 228 B.R. at 173
section 506(b) exists even if there is (quoting In re Terry Ltd. Partnership, 27 F. 3d
241,243 (7th Cir. 1994)). The Fifth Circuit
has adopted a comparable standard, hold6
Id. at 172 (quoting 4 Collier on Bank- ing that the determination of whether to apruptcy I)[ 506.04[2][b][ii] at 506-114).
ply the default rate, rather than the
7
Id. at 173 (quoting In re Hallstrom, 133 pre-default rate, would be ultimately decided
B.R. 535,539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991)).
by looking beyond the contract to examine
8 489 u.s. 235 (1989).
the equities involved. 228 B.R. at 173.
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defin[ing] the protections to which
a secured creditor is entitled, and the
means through which the court may
grant that protection." 11 Thus, within
the exercise of its equitable powers,
it is clear that a bankruptcy court
may not act so as to burden the statutory rights of oversecured creditors.
The district court stated further
that "default rates of interest do not
enjoy, however, the same straightforward treatment that postpetition
interest claims for basic interest do
generally." 12 In the absence of a consensus among the courts as to the
treatment of default interest and the
circumstances under which recovery
is appropriate, the district court fashioned a general rule to govern its
consideration of the case:
where the circumstances necessitating an equitable deviation are plainly
absent and the contract interest rate
does not violate state usury laws,
function as a penalty, or exceed the
value of the collateral, the presumption in favor of the contract rate has
not been rebutted. To do otherwise is
to impinge on a creditor's statutory
rights under section 506(b)Y
11 228 B.R. at 173 (quoting 489 U.S. at
248 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595. at 4-5
(1977)).
12
228 B.R. at 172.
13
228 B.R. at 174. The district court
found support for its reasoning in Ruskin v.
Griffiths, 269 F.2d 827, 831-32 (2d Cir.
1959), a case involving similar facts in which
the Second Circuit held:
In the bankruptcy context, where the
debtor is solvent and, therefore, the unsecured creditors would not be harmed
by the imposition of a higher interest rate
and the contest over default interest involves only a creditor and a stockholder/
debtor, payment of the default rate of
interest may be proper.
228 B.R. at 174.

Equitable Considerations
The district court then examined
existing case law to determine the
relevant equitable considerations.
First, the district court discussed the
need to balance the equities between
debtor and creditor. Within this factor, a court must equitably adjust
contending creditors' claims and
rights, and effectuate a fair distribution of a debtor's property among
those creditors. 14 Quoting another
bankruptcy court, the district court
stated:
It is reasonable to conclude that an
excessive default interest rate imposed by a secured creditor serves as
a penalty, or hammer ... as against
other creditors, not the debtor, and
specifically against unsecured creditors. This is particularly true in a
bankruptcy situation where the unsecured creditors are already probably
taking a substantial hit on their
claims. 15

Due to the enactment of section
506(b) and the statutory right it ere14
Id. at 175. See, e.g., In re Maywood,
Inc., 210 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1997) (precluding default interest on the
equities of the case and noting that it was
"unclear whether the unsecured creditors ..
. [would] receive any distribution whatsoever"); In re Consolidated Properties Ltd.
Partnership, 152 B.R. 452,458 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1993) (precluding default interest on the
equities and noting that collection of the
default interest rate and late charges would
at be "at the expense of junior creditors");
In re Hollstrom, 133 B.R. 535, 541 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1991) (holding that a court is to be
guided by the Bankruptcy Code, applicable
case law, the facts of the case, and "the equitable principles of distribution among
creditors in bankruptcy").
15
228 B.R. at 175 (quoting In re
Hollstrom, 133 B.R. at 541).
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ates to postpetiton interest, the district court found it questionable
whether other creditors' rights impact the determination of the appropriate rate of interest. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Ron Pair noted
that, "[a]lthough the payment of
postpetition interest is arguably
somewhat in tension with the desirability of paying all creditors as uniformly as practicable, Congress
expressly chose to create that alleged
tension. There is no reason to suspect that Congress did not mean
what the language of the statute
says." 16 Nonetheless, there were no
junior creditors, secured or unsecured, in the Dixon case who would
have been prejudiced by the Lender
collecting the default interest rate.
The Debtor had the money necessary
to settle the Lender's claim set aside
in an escrow account, and those
funds were not needed to satisfy
other creditors.
The district court also considered
the equitable balance between the
Lender and the Debtor. The premise
of this consideration is that a secured
creditor's rights may be more restricted in bankruptcy because of the
policy of giving a debtor an opportunity to reorganize. However, the
district court found this consideration inapplicable in the Dixon case
because there was no evidence that
suggested that satisfaction of the
Lender's claim would unduly burden the Debtor's financial state of
affairs or reorganization efforts.
16

489 U.S. at 246-46.
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Another equitable concern is that
the default interest rate may function
as "a coercive penalty rather than a
bargained for attempt to compensate
a creditor for its extra costs after a
default." 17 Where the default rate is
designed to coerce performance,
rather than as a means of compensating the non-breaching party, the default interest rate is deemed a penalty,
and it is inequitable to allow a penalty
to affect the debtor's chance of reorganization or burden other creditms.
The district court held that a default rate may not be deemed a penalty against other creditors, where,
as is the case in Dixon, no creditors
will be damaged by awarding the
claim and no evidence exists to indicate the Lender intended the default rate as a means of coercing
payment. The district court reasoned
that, as the thirty-six percent default
rate was within the bounds of state
usury law, the bankruptcy court's
characterization of the default rate
as "exorbitant" or noting that it is a
large increase ffom the non-default
rate is not enough, without other
evidence, to render it a penalty. The
district court found it sufficient that
the Lender represented to the court
that the default rate was proportionate to the reasonably anticipated
damages resulting from a default by
the Debtor. "While a thirty-six percent interest rate is high, the courts
do not have plenary power to alter
commercial contracts or to substitute
17
228 B.R. at 175 (quoting In re Consolidated Properties Ltd. Partnership, 152
B.R. 452,455 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993)).
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their judgment for that of the parties."18
The district court acknowledged
that some courts, including the bankruptcy court in this case, have required creditors to provide some
affirmative justification for the default interest rate, either through
demonstrated need or industry practice. The district court disagreed with
these courts, stating that such a per
se rule "seems to go against the purpose behind the use of default rates"
and would unnecessarily burden the
statutory rights of the Lender. 19 "Default interest rates are used as a
means of compensating a lender for
the unpredictable and hard to quantify administrative expenses and inconvenience in monitoring untimely
payments. 'The costs incurred in
performing this task vary from case
to case and simply cannot be provided for beforehand. "'20 In the presence of some or all of the above
mentioned equitable circumstances,
the majority of courts have required
some affirmative showing of reasonableness by the creditor in order to
recover postpetition interest at the
default rate. 21 The district court did
11

not require the Lender to make an
affirmative showing of reasonableness because there were no equitable
considerations necessitating a deviation from the default interest rate.
In reaching its conclusion to award
default rate interest under the facts
of the case, the district court was not
unmindful of the "cure rationale"
evoked by the Ninth Circuit in In re
Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. 22
There the,&ourt of appeals held that
a debtor may defeat a creditor's
claim for interest at the default rate
by fully curing the default. By curing, the debtor was able to avoid all
adverse consequences of the default,
including the obligation to pay default rate interest. Under that rationale, the debtor may avoid default
rate interest by providing in a Chapter 11 plan that the debt will be cured
and reinstated so that it will be fully
paid upon maturity. However, this
cure rationale was inapplicable in
Dixon because the district court
found that the Debtor did not cure
the default in that case.
In sum, the district court in Dixon
held that the bankruptcy court's disallowance of the default interest rate
was unwarranted because (i) the
thirty-six percent default interest rate
was not usurious under applicable
state law, (ii) the interest sought by
the Lender, when added to the principal amount of its claim, did not
exceed the value of the collateral
securing the claim, and (iii) equi-

228 B.R. at 178
228 B.R. at 174 n. 8.
20 ld. (quoting In re Terry Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d at 244).
21 Id. at 176. See, e.g., In re Terry Ltd.
Partnership, 27 F.3d at 243-44; In re Consolidated Properties Ltd. Partnership, 152
B.R. at 457; In re Hallstrom, 133 B.R. at
539-40. "Where the default rate of interest
cannot then be justified by the creditor, ei- ·
ther by showing a 'demonstrated need or by
prevailing industry practice,' the courts have Terry Ltd. Partnership, 27 F. 3d 241, 244 (7th
deferred to the non-default, contract inter- Cir. 1994)).
22 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).
est rate." 228 B.R. at 176 (quoting In re
19
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table circumstances necessary to allow a court to deviate from the contract default rate did not exist. "The
Code and applicable case law, facts
of the case, and equitable principles
of distribution compel that Dixon
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should be held to the contract default
rate of interest provided in the note.
To find otherwise here would render a windfall to the debtor." 23
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23

228 B.R. at 176.

